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RESPONSE TO NATURE OF THE CASE
It is obvious that Appellant and Appellee view the nature of
this case differently.

Rather than discuss this in great detail,

Appellant refers the court to her opening brief. Appellee claims
that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at the trial level was vague
and only cited as its basis "constitutional grounds", however,
Appellee misleads the court.
The Motion to Dismiss did state "upon constitutional
grounds", but it did not stop there. The Motion to Dismiss also
cited "and for the reasons set forth in Defendant's memorandum
filed herewith". (Index of Clerk's Papers 61 and Appendix to
Appellant's Opening Brief, Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss A-2)

The trial memorandum cited as the constitutional

grounds the double jeopardy clauses of the Utah and the United
States Constitutions as well as due process problems.
RESPONSE TO ISSUES, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant will not address the incorrect slant placed on the
facts by Appellee, but refers the court to her opening brief and
the record.
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENT OF FAILURE TO PRESERVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
As pointed out above, Appellee misleads the court on the
issue of whether or not due process was preserved as an issue for
this appeal and claims that this issue was never before the trial
court.

The record is clear that such a statement is contrary to

the facts and the record. In Appellant's Memorandum In Support of
Motion to Dismiss, Appellant discussed Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
1

480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed. 40, (1987), where the State
failed to turn over to the defense taped interviews with an
alleged victim.

(Index of Clerk's Papers 61 and Appendix to

Opening Brief at A-2) Defendant stated in her memorandum to the
trial court:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that this violated the
confrontation and due process clauses of the federal
constitution. The Supreme Court on review at the request of
the prosecution held that a Defendant is entitled to all
information held by the State related to an offense, but
that in the case of child protective records, the inspection
of those records should be done by the court before the
records are turned over to the Defendant ij£ the State claims
the records are confidential and not subject to disclosure.
(Emphases added.)
Appellant also discussed due process in the memorandum when
she discussed prosecutorial vindictiveness:
The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant is
entitled to be protected from "the vindictive exercise of a
prosecutor's discretion." Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21,
94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). In Perry, a North
Carolina prison inmate sought a writ of habeas corpus when a
prosecutor charged him with a felony after he sought to
exercise his rights to a trial de novo. The Supreme Court
held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was contravened by such conduct. The court held that a
defendant is entitled to pursue her rights without
apprehension that the state will retaliate with additional
charges. Proof of actual vindictiveness is not required:
There is, of course, no evidence that the prosecutor in this
case acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking a felony
indictment against Perry. (Emphasis added.)
In Bordenkircher v. Haves, 98 S.Ct. 663, 434 U.S. 357,
(1978), the Supreme Court stated that the bringing of
additional changes against a Defendant who refuses to do as
the prosecution suggests is "prosecutorial vindictiveness":
This Court held in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
725, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "requires that
vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully
attacked his first conviction must play no part in the
sentence he receives after a new trial."
The same
principle was later applied to prohibit a prosecutor from
2

reindicting a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge
after the defendant had invoked an appellate remedy, since
in this situation there was also a "realistic likelihood of
'vindictiveness.' " Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S., at 27,
94 S.Ct., at 2102. (Emphasis added.)
Then later, in Perry, the Court applied the same principle
to prosecutorial conduct where there was a "realistic
likelihood of 'vindictiveness.' " 417 U.S., at 27, 94
S.Ct., at 2102.
It held that the requirement of Fourteenth
Amendment due process prevented a prosecutor's reindictment
of a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge after the
defendant had exercised his right to appeal the misdemeanor
conviction and thus to obtain a trial de novo. (Emphasis
added.)
In the summary of Appellant's trial memorandum she pointed
out to the trial court:
The State of Utah cannot retry Defendant. Should this court
disagree, then the court should find that because of the
conduct of the prosecutor the state has violated Defendant's
due process rights so that the case should be dismissed.
Appellee also does not understand the law and relies on
those cases that deal with the failure to object to jury
instructions as the basis for a claim that Appellant has not
preserved her appeal issues at the trial court level. In State v.
Sheldon, 545 P.2d 513,

(Utah 1976), Justice Maughan, in his

dissenting opinion, pointed out:
As can be seen, the rule requiring defenses based on
constitutional grounds be first asserted in the lower court
is not always strictly applied. Particularly is this so
where the constitutional question arises 'in cases involving
the deprivation of life or liberty.' 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal
and Error, Section 574.
This court has heretofore addressed itself to a situation,
similar to the one here on appeal, where the constitutional
issue was first raised on appeal. In the matter of In Re
Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110 (1963). Mr. Chief
Justice Henriod in giving the opinion of the court said:
"There may be some doubt as to whether we should review the
two points on appeal having to do with the sections
3

mentioned, supra, since they were raised on appeal for the
first time. If what we say in this opinion would jeopardize
the liberty of appellant . . . there would be authority for
raising a constitutional issue for the first time on
appeal."
The main and concurring opinions confuse trial tactics not
objected to, at the trial level, with the constitutionality
of the whole proceeding.
The attempt to try a matter anew, for the first time on
appeal, by advancing a different theory, or by attacking an
instruction not objected to at the trial, is by no stretch
of the imagination concomitant with a constitutional issue.
The former may not effect the legality of the proceeding;
the latter certainly does. The constitution is not subject
to the proceedings, the trial tactics, if you will. The
proceedings are subject to the constitution.
Justice Maughan's points were explained by the United States
Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia, 83 S.Ct. 822, 372 U.S. 391,
(U.S.N.Y. 1963) which was a proceeding upon the application by a
state prisoner for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he
had been deprived of his constitutional rights:
Assume that a man is indicted, and held for trial in a state
court, by a grand jury from which members of his race have
been systematically excluded. Assume further that the State
requires any objection to the composition of the grand jury
to be raised prior to the verdict, that no such objection is
made, and that the defendant seeks to raise the point for
the first time on appeal from his conviction....Our survey
discloses nothing to suggest that the Federal District Court
lacked the power to order Noia discharged because of a
procedural forfeiture he may have incurred under state
law
State procedural rules plainly must yield to this
overriding federal policy.
A fortiori, due process denied in the proceedings
leading to conviction is not restored just because the state
court declines to adjudicate the claimed denial on the
merits
Not only is Appellee's claim that the due process issue was
not preserved for appeal factually incorrect, it is legally
unsound as constitutional claims are often raised for the first
4

time on appeal.
RESPONSE TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY ARGUMENT
Appellee claims that Appellant asked for a mistrial and
cannot now challenge its granting.

Law must be read with reason.

Appellant was forced to either continue a trial before a jury
taunted by the prosecution or request a mistrial. Reason and case
law, as pointed out in Appellant's opening brief, states that
under such circumstances, Appellant has not voluntarily sought a
mistrial. Appellant has "substantial constitutional right
guaranteed her under both the Utah and the United States
Constitutions" which were violated by the prosecution. She cannot
be deemed to have voluntarily requested a mistrial. State v.
Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (1979)
Appellee relies on the claim that the trial court found no
"bad faith" on the part of the prosecutor, but "bad faith" is not
required nor are the findings of the trial court binding in this
issue even if they were:
a North Carolina prison inmate sought a writ of habeas
corpus when a prosecutor charged him with a felony after he
sought to exercise his rights to a trial de novo. The
Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was contravened by such conduct. The
court held that a defendant is entitled to pursue her rights
without apprehension that the state will retaliate with
additional charges. Proof of actual vindictiveness is not
required. Blackledqe v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098,
40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974).
(Emphasis added.)
The record supports Appellant's position that, but for the
conduct of the Appellee, she would not have been forced to seek a
mistrial to insure she received a fair trial. Appellant believes
that she has adequately cover the double jeopardy issue in her
5

opening brief.
DISCOVERY VIOLATION
Appellee claims that there was "no discovery violation"
because the state "provided all that it had".

A similar factual

issue was addressed in State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, (Utah
1985) :
When a request or an order for discovery is made pursuant to
§ 77-35-16(a), a prosecutor must comply. To meet basic
standards of fairness and to ensure that a trial is a real
quest for truth and not simply a contest between the parties
to win, a defendant's request for information which has been
voluntarily complied with, or a court order of discovery
must be deemed to be a continuing request. And even though
there is no court-ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's failure
to disclose newly discovered inculpatory information which
falls with the ambit of § 77-35-16(a), after the prosecution
has made a voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead
defendant as to cause prejudicial error.
After and obvious attempt to avoid admitting that there was
discovery which Appellee fail to disclose, the prosecutor admits
that there was. (Appellee Brief at 19) and Transcript of February
23, 1999, pages 13-15)
The Court: You know, it would just help if you would just
say there wasn't a tape of it. Is there a tape?
Mr. Halls: There is a tape. There's a video tape of an
interview with the victim....
Appellee tries to avoid the implications of due process by
focusing on the claim that there was no transcript of the tape
and accuses counsel of ungentlemanly conduct for pursuing the
issue of the failure to produce potentially exculpatory evidence.
Appellee concedes this at page 21 of its brief:
The Defendant asserts that such tapes may contain
exculpatory information which could have been used as a tool
6

to cross examine the victim
While these assertions may
be true; nothing prevented counsel from going to the
prosecutor's office and viewing the tapes..., (Emph a sis
added.)
At issue in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, was the State's
failure to turn over taped interviews with alleged victims. The
United States Supreme Court held that the defendant v/as entitled
to copies of the tapes. Appellee here claims that the United
States Supreme Court is wrong since it did not both to have a
transcript of the tapes prepared.
Appellee also cites Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure that allows inspection at the prosecutor's office "when
convenience reasonably requires".

The question must be posed:

Does convenience require counsel for Appellant to travel from
Phoenix, Arizona, to Monticello, Utah, a drive of eight (8)
hours, to view the video tape or does convenience and due process
require that a copy of the tape be made at a cost of less than
$10 and the copy be sent to counsel for Appellant?
It appears that Appellee interprets Rule 16 to mean what is
"convenient" to Appellee rather than what Rule 16 contemplates
which is that parties to litigation work together in criminal
prosecutions to aid in the "search for truth upon which a just
judgment may be predicated" so that the "procedural rules" which
"are designed to promote that objective, not frustrate it" can be
properly implemented and so that "a criminal proceeding" becomes
"more than an adversarial contest between two competing sides".
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, (Utah 1985)

7

CONCLUSIONS
The State of Utah should not be permitted to retry
Defendant* This court should find that because of the conduct of
the prosecutor the state has violated Defendant's due process
rights so that the case should be dismissed.

Respectfully Submitted,

^m^t—

C. ROBERT COLLINS
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
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